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ADMIRALTY-SETTLEMENT-LIABILITY OF NONSETTLING DEFENDANT-PROPORTIONATE SHARE-The United States Supreme

Court held that a nonsettling defendant's liability in an admiralty action should be calculated by an allocation of proportionate
responsibility and not by giving the nonsettling defendant a
dollar for dollar credit for the amount paid by a settling defendant.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).

On October 10, 1986, McDermott, Inc. ("McDermott") was
attempting to use a crane mounted on a work barge to install a
deck on an offshore oil and gas drilling platform.' The hook and
sling portions of the crane failed and the deck crashed down
onto the barge.2 The accident resulted in extensive damage to
both the deck and the equipment.' The crane had been designed
and manufactured by AmClyde ("AmClyde").' The hook had
been manufactured by River Don Castings, Ltd. ("River Don").'
The sling had been supplied by a group of three companies.'
McDermott brought an admiralty action against AmClyde,
River Don and the sling defendants in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking to recover damages to both the deck and the equipment.7 On the day before

1. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1463 (1994). The deck
weighed 3,950 tons. McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir.
1992), rev'd in part, McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
2. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1463.
3. McDermott, 979 F.2d at 1070. AmClyde had previously been known as
Clyde Iron and was a division of AMCA International, Inc. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at
1463 n.1.
4. McDermott, 114 S. Ct at 1463.
5. Id. River Don had produced the crane under a sub-contract with AmClyde.
McDermott, 979 F.2d at 1070.
6. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1463. The suppliers of the sling were International Southwest Sling, Inc., British Ropes, Ltd., and Hendrik Veder B.V. Id. at 1463
n.2.
7. Id. at 1463-64. The district court had admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to
section 1333 of title 28 of the United States Code. Id. The relevant portions of the
statute provide:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the states, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors
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the trial, McDermott entered into a settlement with the sling
defendants for $1 million.8
At trial, the judge ruled that McDermott could not recover for
damage to the crane.9 As part of its opening statement,
McDermott accepted responsibility for the damage attributable
to the sling defendants. 0 The jury determined the damage to
the deck to be $2.1 million and attributed the cause of the accident thirty-two percent to AmClyde, thirty-eight percent to River
Don and thirty percent to McDermott and the sling defendants." The trial court denied AmClyde and River Don's motion to reduce the damage award pro tanto"2 by the sling
defendants' settlement and entered judgment in accordance with
the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility."3
AmClyde and River Don appealed the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit." The Fifth Circuit held that a clause in the contract between McDermott and
AmClyde barred McDermott's claim for the damage to the deck
and therefore the district court erred in denying defendants'
motion for a pro tanto credit. 5 Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed the judgment against AmClyde and reduced the judgment against River Don to $470,000.'6
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988).
8. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1464. Under the terms of the settlement,
McDermott agreed to release the sling defendants from liability and to indemnify
them in the event of contribution actions by the other defendants. Id.
9. Id. AmClyde and River Don originally moved for a partial summary judgment claiming that the contract between AmClyde and McDermott limited their liability to the repair and replacement of the damaged equipment. McDermott, 979
F.2d at 1070. This motion was denied. Id. The district court, relying on an earlier
Supreme Court case, held that McDermott could not recover for the damage to the
crane but that it could recover for damage to the deck as "other property." Id. at
1071 (citing East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858
(1986) (holding that admiralty law did not recognize a right of recovery for product
damage and resulting economic loss)).
10. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1464. The Supreme Court characterized
McDermott's acceptance of this responsibility as "obscure" and reasoned that it must
have been done in order to prevent liability under its indemnity obligation. Id. at
1464 n.4.
11. Id. at 1464.
12. A pro tanto credit is a one-to-one reduction of the award against a
nonsettling defendant by the amount paid by a settling defendant. Id. at 1465.
13. Id. at 1464. The Defendants relied on Hernandez v. MIV RAJAAN.
McDermott, 979 F.2d at 1070 (citing Hernandez v. MXT RAJAAN, 841 F.2d 582 (5
Cir. 1988)). In Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit reduced an award against a shipowner
by the amount that an injured stevedore had recovered by settling with a third
party defendant. Hernandez, 841 F.2d at 591. See notes 106-10 and accompanying
text for discussion of the Hernandez decision.
14. McDermott, 979 F.2d at 1070.
15. Id. at 1076.
16. Id. at 1081. To arrive at the $470,000 figure the Fifth Circuit used a two
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Because the circuits were split, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari."7 In a unanimous opinion delivered by
Justice Stevens, the Court explained that Congress had neither
provided policy guidance nor limited the Court's ability to create
a rule in this case." The Court relied on United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.'9 as an example of judicial reformation of an
"unnecessarily crude and inequitable" rule in favor of one that
promoted fairness.20 However, unlike in Reliable Transfer, the
Court explained, no consensus existed as to the rule that should
be applied to the instant situation.2'
The Court identified three principal alternatives for determining a nonsettling defendant's liability: pro tanto with contribution, 22 pro tanto without contribution 23 and proportionate
share. 4 In determining which of the three alternatives it would
follow, the Court identified three policy considerations as controlling: consistency with Reliable Transfer, encouragement of
settlement and judicial economy.25
Based on these considerations, the Court immediately dis-

step calculation; first the court subtracted the 30% ($630,000) that was attributable
to McDermott and the sling defendants from the $2.1 million in total damages and
then, from that amount, it subtracted the $1 million settlement. Id. In calculating
the amount of liability attributable to McDermott, the court treated McDermott and
the sling defendants as a single entity, presumably because McDermott had accepted
responsibility for the sling defendants' portion of the damages. Id.
17. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1464. See McDermott v. AmClyde, 113 S. Ct.
3033 (1993) (granting certiorari).
18. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1464-65.
19. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). In Reliable Transfer, the Court replaced the divided
damage rule, which required equal division of damage whenever two parties were at
fault in a collision, with a rule basing liability on an allocation of proportionate
fault. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 410. See notes 70-76 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Reliable Transfer decision.
20. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1465 (citing Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 409).
21. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1465.
22. Id. Under the pro tanto with contribution approach, the plaintiffs claim is
dismissed and the amount of the settlement is credited toward the eventual judgment; defendants who have paid more than their equitable share retain a right of
contribution. Id.
23. Id. Under the pro tanto without contribution approach, the plaintiffs claim
is dismissed and the settlement amount is credited toward the eventual judgment;
defendants who have paid more than their equitable share do not have a right of
contribution. Id.
24. Id. Under the proportionate share approach, the plaintiffs claim is dismissed, but the settlement amount is not credited toward the judgment; the settlement reduces the judgment against nonsettling defendants by the proportionate
share of the settling defendant. Id. The proportionate share approach is commonly
referred to as the pro rata approach. Id. at 1466 n.9. The Court deliberately avoided
the use of that term because it was also frequently used to denote equal allocation
of responsibility among defendants without regard to fault. Id.
25. Id. at 1466-67.
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missed the pro tanto with contribution approach, reasoning that
this approach failed to serve the first two policy considerations.26 The Court explained that the pro tanto with contribution rule simultaneously created a disincentive to settle and led
to additional, unnecessary litigation by allowing favorable settlements to be defeated by subsequent contribution actions."
The choice between the remaining two options was found to be
less decisive, so the Court compared the interaction of each
approach with the desired policy objectives.28 The proportionate
share approach was recognized as better serving the underlying
policy of Reliable Transfer because a litigating defendant would
only be asked to pay its equitable share of the judgment." The
Court reasoned that the pro tanto without contribution approach
would frequently result in discrepancies between a defendant's
legal and equitable share of the damages."0 The Court identified this as a likely phenomenon because settlements were not
usually good predictions of liability and were frequently the
result of compromise in order to avoid litigation.31 This problem
was further compounded, according to the Court, by the fact that
settlements could be used as "war chests ' to finance suits
against other defendants. 2 The Court noted that judiciaries
and legislatures had frequently required that the pro tanto without contribution approach be augmented with mandatory good
faith hearings. 3 The Court explained, however, that such hearings had significant drawbacks because they were cursory mech-

26. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1467.
27. Id. The Court recognized that although this effect could be mitigated by
an indemnity agreement, curative measures would come at the expense of additional
litigation to enforce such agreements. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1467. Discrepancies would occur because settlements were often
based on more factors than those relating to liability and therefore usually did not
represent accurate forecasts of a jury's eventual apportionment of damages. Id. For
example, a defendant who had suffered $100 worth of damages at the hands of
three equally responsible wrongdoers might readily accept a settlement of $10 from
two of the three who were willing to settle to avoid trial. If,then, at the trial,
plaintiffs damages were determined to be $100, the nonsettling defendant would be
forced to pay $80 under the pro tanto approach.
31. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1467.
32. Id.
33. Id. A good faith hearing is a mechanism for protecting a settling defendant from contribution actions upon a showing that the settlement was a fair forecast of its equitable share of the judgment. Id. The Court reasoned that a pro tanto
approach without a right of contribution needed to be coupled with good faith hearings in order to avoid inequities. Id. at 1469. This fact was apparently recognized by
respondents and amicus, as none of them urged the court to adopt the pro tanto
rule without accompanying good faith hearings. Id.
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anisms that imposed additional burdens on the courts and seldom served their intended purpose adequately. 4 The Court
concluded that the pro tanto without contribution approach,
even when coupled with good faith hearings, was likely to result
in an inequitable allocation of liability and was therefore inconsistent with the policy considerations of Reliable Transfer.3 5
Next the Court examined the effect of the two rules on settlement. 6 The Court acknowledged that the pro tanto without
contribution rule promoted more settlements, but that it did so
largely as a result of the inequities discussed above. 7 This occurred because a settling party often paid less than its equitable
share while a nonsettling party was faced with the possibility of
paying the balance of the entire judgment." The Court reasoned that although public policy favored settlement, such an
approach served that policy with too heavy a hand by unnecessarily pressuring defendants.39 The same ends, according to the
Court, would also be achieved by existing, evenhanded incentives.' The Court found no reason why either of the two approaches could not yield comparable settlement rates. 41

34. Id. at 1468. The Court also pointed out that even where such hearings
worked as intended, they often produced inequities. Id. As an example, the Court
presented a hypothetical in which a plaintiff suffered $1 million in damages and
only one of two equally culpable defendants settled for $250,000. Id. at 1468 n.19.
At the good faith hearing, the settling defendant persuasively showed that the settlement figure was based on a good faith mutual agreement that it was 50% responsible and that plaintiff had a 50% chance of prevailing at trial. Id. At trial, however, the damages were determined to be $1 million and each defendant was found to
be 50% culpable. Id. Thus, under the pro tanto approach, the court would be faced
with the unfortunate situation of either preventing the overpaying defendant from
recovering or penalizing the defendant who arrived at its settlement in good faith.
Id.
35. Id. at 1468.
36. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1468.
37. Id. The Court also added that coupling this approach with mandatory good
faith hearings, as was almost universally done, significantly reduced the likelihood of
settlement, because a settling defendant was saddled with the extra burden of showing that a settlement was a fair forecast of its potential liability. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1468-69. Such incentives included the desire to avoid litigation, to
maintain certainty, and to continue commerce. Id. at 1469. The Court reasoned that
such real life considerations made a more convincing case for the proportionate
share approach than the theoretical ones often levied in favor of the pro tanto approach. Id. As authority for this notion, the Court cited an empirical study which
considered the effect of complex factors such as litigation costs and perceived probabilities of victory on settlement behavior and concluded that "neither rule is consistently better than the other." Id. at 1469 n.24 (citing Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlement Under Joint and Severable Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
427 (1993)).
41. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1468. The Court noted that over 95% of the
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The Court next turned its attention to the effect of the differing approaches on judicial economy, and found that neither rule
was superior. 2 In order to avoid significant inequities, the
Court reasoned that the pro tanto without contribution approach
would have to be accompanied by good faith hearings. Thus,
the pro tanto without contribution rule, would require an additional pre-trial hearing while the proportionate share rule would
require only one trial." On this basis, the Court reasoned that
the pro tanto without contribution approach would be more
judicially economical only if a settling defendant's liability could
be calculated more efficiently at a good faith hearing than at a
trial." The Court also pointed out that where a settling defendant was not present at trial, a nonsettling defendant might be
inclined to "argue the empty chair"" in an attempt to show
that
the settling defendant was solely responsible for the damag47
es.

The Court concluded that neither rule was superior in its
ability to promote settlement or judicial economy, but that the
proportionate share rule was more consistent with Reliable
Transfer." The Court, therefore, elected to adopt the proportionate share approach."
The Court also rejected two additional arguments; first, that
adoption of the proportionate share approach was inconsistent
with the "one satisfaction rule"" and second, that the adoption
cases filed in federal court never made it to trial and that the vast majority of
those were settled. Id. at 1468 n.22 (citing Herbert M. Kritzre, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163-64 (1986)).
42. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1469.
43. Id. The Court noted that no party or amicus urged the adoption of the pro
tanto without contribution rule without good faith hearing because of the inequities
that would result. Id.
44. Id. The Court also explained that the pro tanto rule created a unique
problem in cases in which the settlement covered more damage than was the object
of the trial. Id. at 1470 n.26. Under such circumstances, the judge would have the
additional burden of separating the settlement into trial and non-trial related portions. Id.
45. Id. at 1469. The Court observed, however, that a trial could be equally as
economical as a hearing, and perhaps even more so, because the jury would only
have to apportion liability based on evidence already introduced. Id. at 1469-70.
46. Id. at 1470. Arguing the empty chair is an attempt to convince a jury that
a defendant who is not present at trial was exclusively responsible for the damages.
Id.
47. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1470.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The one satisfaction rule, in its early nineteenth and twentieth century
form, barred a plaintiff who had settled with one of two joint tortfeasors from suing
the other. Id. The respondents urged the court to adopt a modified version of this
rule that would operate only to reduce an award against a nonsettling defendant to
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of the proportionate share approach would be inconsistent with
precedent."' In rejecting the first argument, the Court held that
the one satisfaction rule was not applicable to the instant situation. 2 The Court observed that the law contained no absolute
prohibition on overcompensation and that policy considerations,
such as those underlying the "collateral benefits rule"53 established the principle that ensuring that wrongdoers paid was
more important than preventing overcompensation. The Court
added that because settlements were only estimates of liability
based on complex factors, they could not be expected to precisely
reflect eventual damage awards.5 5 Thus, the Court reasoned, a
defendant should not expect to have its equitable liability reduced by another defendant's willingness to settle.' Such an
approach was believed to best serve the underlying principles of
proportionate responsibility - that a defendant pay exactly its
equitable share.5 7
The Court next rejected the argument that the proportionate
share approach was inconsistent with Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique.' In Edmonds, the Supreme Court
considered the effect of payment under the Longshoremen and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 9 on a nonsettling
defendant's liability."' Because there was no settlement involved in Edmonds, the Court elected to read it as merely an
application of settled principles of joint and several liability.6 '
The Court held that there was no inconsistency between concepts of joint and several liability and allocations of proportion-

the extent necessary to prevent compensation beyond the jury's determination of the
loss. Id.
51. Id. at 1470-71.
52. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1470.
53. Id. Under the collateral benefits rule, if a defendant received compensation
for injuries from a source wholly independent from the wrongdoer, the wrongdoer
would not be credited for the amount received. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (6th
ed. 1990).
54. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1470. The Court further pointed out that it was
entirely more likely that a defendant would be under-compensated than* over-compensated. Id. at 1471.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 443 U.S. 256 (1979). In Edmonds, the Supreme Court refused to reduce a
judgment against a shipowner by the proportionate fault attributable to a stevedore
whose liability was limited by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 263-64. See notes 89-96 and the accompanying
text for discussion of the Edmonds decision.
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
60. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1471 (citing Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 271-72 n.30).
61. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1471.
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ate liability because the former applied to judgments against
multiple defendants and the latter applied only to settlements."2 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ordering that River Don's liability be determined with reference to the jury's allocation of its proportionate responsibility.6
In The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson," the United States
Supreme Court first considered the issue of apportionment of
damages in an admiralty action." The Schooner Catharine involved the division of damages between a plaintiff and defendant, both of whom were at fault in a collision. 6 The Court
held that where both parties were at fault in a collision, the
damages should be divided-equally among them. 7 In adopting
the divided damages rule, the Court relied heavily on the fact
that such a rule prevailed in English admiralty law."s The
Court reasoned that the rule both provided the most equitable
division of liability and encouraged care by all those engaged in
navigation.69
After almost one hundred twenty years of applying the divided damages rule, the Supreme Court re-examined the rule's
applicability in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.7" Reliable

62. Id. at 1471-72.
63. Id. at 1472.
64. 58 U.S. 170 (1854), overruled by United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
421 U.S. 397 (1975).
65. The Schooner Catharine, 58 U.S. at 177.
66. Id. at 177-78. The schooners Catharine and St. Louis collided off the coast
of New York Harbor. Id. at 173. The owners of the St. Louis brought a libel against
the Catharine in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Id. A libel is a pleading in admiralty akin to a complaint in terrestrial law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 916 (6th ed. 1990). The district court found the Catharine
liable and referred the issue of damages to a commissioner. The Schooner Catharine,
58 U.S. at 174. The commissioner's findings were later affirmed by the circuit court.
Id. The Supreme Court reversed the findings of fact concerning liability and found
both parties at fault in the collision. Id. at 177.
67. Id. at 177-78. Although the issue was of first impression for the Supreme
Court, the divided damages approach had been routinely applied in the lower courts.
Id. at 177 (citations omitted). Under the divided damages rule, the damage sustained by both parties is added together and then divided equally among all parties
who are adjudged at fault regardless of proportionate responsibility. The North Star,
106 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1882).
68. The Schooner Catharine, 58 U.S. at 177.
69. Id. at 178.
70. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). Over the one hundred twenty year period, the rule
was applied to property damage and personal injuries when the Court found it to be
just and proper. See Cooper Stevedoring v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110
(1974). The rule was expanded to cover personal injury and property damage caused
to innocent third persons. See Cooper Stevedoring, 417 U.S. at 110 (citing The
Chattanooche, 137 U.S. 540 (1899); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); The Alabama, 92
U.S. 695 (1876) and The Washington, 76 U.S. 513 (1870)). The rule had also been
read to apply where a ship struck a pier and also when one ran aground due to the
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Transfer involved the apportionment of liability between a plaintiff and a defendant who were both at fault in a collision.71 The
Court abandoned the divided damages rule, and held that where
two or more parties were at fault in a maritime collision, the
liability of the parties should be calculated by their respective
degrees of proportionate fault.72 The Court re-examined the policy considerations on which the divided damages rule rested and
determined that they were no longer applicable.7" The rule was
only capable of providing a just result, according to the Court,

where the parties to a collision were equally at fault. 4 The
Court reasoned that careful navigation would be encouraged by
a rule that fully punished degrees of wrongdoing, rather than by
a rule that capped a wrongdoers liability at half of the total
damages.75 Because the divided damages rule applied only after
there had been a collision and was not subject to expectation
based reliance, the Court concluded that it was free to replace it
with a proportionate fault based rule.7"
In Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit con-

fault of both parties. See Cooper Stevedoring, 417 U.S. at 110 (citing White Oak
Transportation Co. v. Boston Cape Cod & New York Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922)
and Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. 389 (1875)). The divided damages rule, however,
was not applicable to personal injury actions in the admiralty jurisdiction. See
Heilycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 446 (1967).
71. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 401. The tanker Mary A. Whalen, owned by
Reliable Transfer, ran aground near Rockaway Point outside New York Harbor. Id.
at 398. Reliable Transfer sued the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act
and the Federal Torts Claims Act, alleging that the accident was caused by the
Coast Guard's negligent failure to maintain a breakwater light. Id. at 399. The district court found the Coast Guard 25% liable and Reliable Transfer 75% liable, but
divided the damages equally. Id. at 400. The court of appeals affirmed. Id.
72. Id. at 410. The Court held that the damages were only to be divided
equally when either the parties were equally at fault or when it was impossible to
allocate proportionate degrees of responsibility. Id.
73. Id. at 402-10. The Court noted that the United States was among the
minority of maritime nations still applying the divided damages rule. Id. at 403-04.
The Court also pointed out that the rule had been frequently criticized in lower
courts and only reluctantly followed. Id. at 404. The Court gave a laundry list of
terms used by the lower courts to describe the operation of the rule including "unfair, illogical, arbitrary, archaic and frequently unjust." Id. Judge Hand, the Court
noted, had also called for the rule to be abandoned. Id. at 404-05 (citing Oriental
Trading & Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil, 173 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1949)).
74. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 405. As an example of the inequitable operation of the rule, the Court explained that the damages would be divided equally
even where one ship was only slightly at fault and another was substantially at
fault in a collision. Id.
75. Id. at 405 nll. Such an unfair rule, according to the Court, could not be
justified under the guise of avoiding complex determinations of percentage of fault.
Id. at 407.
76. Id. at 410.
77. 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
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sidered the effect of Reliable Transfer on -a nonsettling
defendant's liability in a personal injury action."8 In Leger, an
employee was injured while working on a barge during operations on an offshore oil drilling platform.79 The employee sued
his employer and both the barge and platform owners.s" The
employer and platform owner settled, but the claim against the
barge owner went to trial.8 ' The trial court denied the
nonsettling defendant's motion for a pro tanto credit against the
judgment in the amount of the settlement." Instead, the district court applied the proportionate share approach, reducing
the jury award by both the plaintiff's and the settling
defendants' respective degrees of fault."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the case simply
called for an application of Reliable Transfer and Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kope, Inc." to a situation in which some of

78. Leger, 592 F.2d at 1249.
79. Id. at 1247. Leger was employed by Drilling Well Control, Inc.; the barge
was owned by Dresser Offshore Services, Inc.; the platform was owned by Continental Oil Company. Id.
80. Id. Claims against Drilling Well were predicated on the Jones Act and
general maritime law; claims against Dresser and Continental were predicated on
general maritime law. Id. The Jones Act gives seamen a cause of action in negligence against their employer for injuries sustained in the course of their employment. See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). General maritime law provides seamen with
maintenance and cure, and warranty of seaworthiness remedies. See Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 157, 175 (1987). Maintenance and cure
is a no fault remedy entitling a seamen to wages and medical expenses when injured while in the service of his vessel. Id. at 159; see also The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158, 175 (1903). The warranty of seaworthiness is a non-delegable duty placed on
shipowners to provide a vessel and appurtenant gear fit for their intended purpose.
The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
81. Leger, 592 F.2d at 1247. Both Drilling Well and Continental had the same
insurer who paid $82,331 to settle the claim against Drilling Well and $100,000 to
settle the claim against the Continental. Id. The jury determined the total damages
to be $284,090 and allocated responsibility for the accident as 45% to the Dresser,
20% to Continental, 0% to the Drilling Well, and 35% to Leger. Id. at 1248. This
allocation of liability took place at a second trial devoted solely to that issue. Id. at
1247-48. The trial court had granted a motion for a new trial on the grounds that
the jury should have been allowed to consider the indemnity agreement between the
settling defendants when allocating responsibility. Id.
82. Id. at 1248.
83. Id.
84. 417 U.S. 106 (1974). In Cooper Stevedoring, a longshoreman was injured
when he stepped in a concealed crevice created by another stevedoring company's
loading of cargo. Cooper Stevedoring, 417 U.S. at 107. The longshoreman sued the
vessel, which filed a third party complaint against the stevedoring company responsible for loading the cargo. Id. at 106. Longshoremen can seek a recovery from a
vessel by an in rem action. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988). On appeal, the Supreme
Court did not reach the issue of the applicability or continued validity of the divided
damages rule because the district court had found that both defendants were 50% at
fault. Cooper Stevedoring, 417 U.S. at 108 n.3. The Court expressly recognized a
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the defendants had settled. 5 Despite the fact that the plaintiff
had received a sum of money exceeding the jury's determination
of damages, the court elected to view the settlement as a favorable bargain rather than a double recovery." The court found
that the double recovery argument drew its strength from hindsight and that the plaintiff could have just as easily been undercompensated. 7 Concluding that it could not adopt a rule that
had the inherent potential of rewarding a defendant who did not
settle, the Fifth Circuit followed the proportionate share approach."
Two months later, in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,s the Supreme Court considered the question
of how to calculate a defendant's share of the damages when a
joint tortfeasor's liability was limited by the 1972 amendment to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act."
In Edmonds, the plaintiff was injured while unloading cargo
from a ship, received benefits from his employer under the statute and then sued the shipowner seeking an additional recovery." The Fourth Circuit interpreted the 1972 Amendment"

right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, reasoning that a defendant should have
the same right as a plaintiff to force a joint tortfeasor to pay for its share of the
damages. Id. at 113.
85. Leger, 592 F.2d at 1249. The Fifth Circuit expressly overruled two previous decisions holding that the pro tanto approach should be used to calculate a
nonsettling defendant's liability. Id. (overruling Billiot v. Stewart, 382 F.2d 662 (5th
Cir. 1967) and Loffland Brothers Co. v. Huckabee, 373 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1967)).
86. Leger, 592 F.2d at 1250.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1251. The Court noted that such a situation would arise under the
pro tanto approach whenever one defendant settled for an amount that turned out
to be more than its equitable share and the other defendant(s) refused to settle. Id.
89. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
90. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 258. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides a scheme of scheduled benefits for maritime employees injured while in the course of their employment. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988 & Supp."
V 1994). Benefits paid under the statutory scheme are an exclusive remedy against
an employer. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The 1972 amendment addressed a shipowner's
liability to Longshoremen. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988)). See note 92 for the relevant text of the statute.
91. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 258. The plaintiff was employed as a longshoreman
by Nacirema Operating Co. to unload cargo from a ship owned by Compagnie Generale Transatlantique. Id. Seeking recovery against Compagnie, Edmonds filed a
negligence action in federal district court. Id. The jury fixed the total damages at
$100,000 and allocated responsibility as 70% to Nacirema, 20% to Compagnie and
10% to Edmonds. Id. The district court awarded the plaintiff a full recovery against
the shipowner reduced only by his own negligence. Id. The district court's decision
was guided by the then existing principles of admiralty law. Id. at 259. A longshoreman had a right to recover full damages against a shipowner, even if his employer
contributed to his injuries. See Cooper Stevedoring, 417 U.S. at 108. A
longshoreman's employer's liability was limited by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
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as mandating that a shipowner's liability to an injured longshoreman be calculated on a proportionate fault basis when the
longshoreman's employer was a joint tortfeasor."3 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that such a result was necessary to reconcile the inconsistency between the first two sentences of the amendment.' The Supreme Court, however, read the
second sentence of the amendment as applying only to the limited class of situations in which a shipowner was directly employing longshoremen, and thus avoided the conflict discovered by
the court of appeals.95 The Court held that while the amendment did prevent a shipowner from recovering against an injured longshoreman's employer under an indemnity agreement,
it did not alter the admiralty rule allowing a longshoreman to
recover in full for his injuries against a shipowner even where
he had already received benefits under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.'
The question of how to calculate a nonsettling defendant's
liability arose again in Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. 7
Workers' Compensation Act and a shipowner could not seek contribution an employer. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1953).
92. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).. The amendment governs the liability of vessels to
longshoremen and provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such a person, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such a vessel
as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title,
and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or
indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If
such a person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no
such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of
persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel.
Id.
Prior to this amendment, a shipowner who was found liable to an injured
longshoreman could seek contribution from the longshoreman's employer under a
theory of breach of duty to provide workmanlike services. See Ryan Stevedoring v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133-34 (1955). The shipowner's right of contribution was eliminated by the amendment. Schoenbaum, cited at note 79, at 233.
93. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 262.
94. Id. The two sentences were irreconcilable, according to the Fourth Circuit,
because the first sentence allowed a longshoreman to recover against a shipowner,
but the second barred recovery if his injury was caused by anyone providing stevedoring services. Id. Under the Fourth Circuit's reading of the statute, a longshoreman had a cause of action against a shipowner, but only as long as his injury had
not been caused, to any extent, by the actions of his employer or a fellow longshoreman. Id. (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153,
1155 (5th Cir. 1978) (a fellow longshoreman's negligence was imputed to the employer)). Thus, the Court concluded that the amendment made no sense unless it was
read to impose a proportionate fault system. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 258-59.
95. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 264.
96. Id. at 263-64.
97. 832 F.2d 1540 (lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1033 (1988).
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Self involved a collision between a ship and a dredge.98 The
plaintiff settled with the shipowner, but the claim against the
dredge owner went to trial.9 The court of appeals reversed the
district court's application of the proportionate share approach
The court found that
and applied the pro tanto rule.'
Edmonds had undermined the validity of the proportionate
share approach endorsed by Leger.0 ° The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Edmonds had established a policy of avoiding undercompensation of injured parties at all costs, and that wrongdoers
rather than victims should bear the burden of unfair allocations
of damages." 2 According to the Eleventh Circuit, because
Edmonds allowed the application of joint and severable liability
even where there was no hope of recovery through contribution
or indemnity, the Supreme Court had established a policy of
ensuring that an injured party always recovered at least the
jury's determination of its total damages."'3 Because the proportionate share approach could result in under-compensation of
an injured party who had settled with a defendant for less than
its equitable share of the damages, the court held that such a
rule was inconsistent with the policy set forth in Edmonds. '
The court concluded that because the pro tanto approach would
always result in compensation at least equal to the jury's determination of damages, it was compelled to adopt the pro tanto

98. Self, 832 F.2d at 1542-43. The ship was owned by the Chevron Transportation Corporation and operated by Chevron Shipping Company (collectively "Chevron"); the dredge was owned by Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company. Id. at
1542. Numerous seamen were killed in the collision, including the petitioner's husband. Id.
99. Id. at 1545. This was the second of two appeals involving this case. Id. at
1544. Originally, Self, and numerous other claimants, filed separate actions against
Great Lakes. Id. Great Lakes filed a third party complaint against Chevron and also
separately sued the owners of the dredge and barge, Chevron and Italia Siciete Per
Az Di Nay. Id. In the first trial, the judge severed the third party complaint and
the jury found Great Lakes negligent; but the case was reversed. See Edbanks v.
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, cert. denied 460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
On remand, all the actions were consolidated and all claims except Self's were settled. Self, 832 F.2d at 1544. Chevron settled with Self for $315,000. Id. at 1545. In
the trial against Great Lakes, the jury determined the total damages to be $661,354
and allocated 70% of the responsibility to Chevron and 30% to Great Lakes. Id. The
district court relied on Leger and applied the proportionate share approach, awarding
Self only 30% of the total damage award. Id.
100. Self, 832 F.2d at 1548.
101. Id. at 1545.
102. Id. at 1546.
103. Id.
104. Id. As authority for this one sided approach, the court cited the remedial
nature of admiralty in fashioning rules for the speedy and full compensation of seamen. Id. at 1548.
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approach.'
In Hernandez v. M/V RAJAAN, 0 6 the Fifth Circuit reexamined its analysis in Leger. In Hernandez, a longshoreman, was
partially paralyzed while unloading a ship."7 The longshoreman sued the vessel and its owner.' On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the defendants were entitled to a credit
for the settlement because the award against them represented
the entirety of the damages less the plaintiffs comparative
0 9
fault."
The court of appeals, however, did not apply the proportionate share approach as it had in Leger, but rather, without
explanation, applied the Eleventh Circuit's pro tanto approach
as outlined in Self."'
The Eighth Circuit, however, in Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Mid-America Transportation Company"' applied
Leger to prevent a seamen's employer from seeking indemnity
and contribution from a joint tortfeasor who had settled with an
injured employee." 2 In Associated Electric, an injured seaman
sued both his employer and a barge owner for injuries sustained
while working on the barge."' The plaintiff settled only his

105. Self, 832 F.2d at 1548.
106. 841 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988).
107. Hernandez, 841 F.2d at 585. Alejandro Hernandez was employed as a
longshoreman and was injured while unloading the M/V RAJAAN. Id. Hernandez
suffered his injury when a winch broke and a 110-pound bag of rice fell onto him.
Id.
108. Id. The M/V RAJAAN was owned by Dianella Shipping Corp. Id. The defendants impleaded numerous third party defendants who settled. Id. These third
party 'defendants included the manufacturer of the winch that broke, the manufacturer of the remote control mechanism used with the winch, the company that
bagged the rice and numerous others who were dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 585 n.1. The settlement included an
agreement that Hernandez would reimburse the settling defendants if he recovered
more than $3 million at trial. Id. at 585. The claims against the vessel and its
owner went to trial. Id. at 585. The district court found Dianella and RAJAAN liable and assessed the total damages at $3,969,693. Id. Liability was found to exist
pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Id. The
district court, however, refused to give the nonsettling defendants any credit for the
settlement, reducing the award by only the 5% comparative fault attributable to
Hernandez. Id.
109. Id. at 591.
110. Id. The only explanation given by the Fifth Circuit for its adoption of Self
was its characterization of the Eleventh Circuit's decision as "sound reasoning." Id.
111. 931 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1991).
112. Associated Electric, 931 F.2d at 1271.
113. Id. 1267-68. Seamen Teddy Teasley was employed by Associated Electric
Cooperative and was working on a barge owned by Mid Atlantic Transportation
Company. Id. He was injured when he slipped and fell after the barge moved unexpectedly. Id. Teasley received maintenance and cure benefits from Associated Electric. Id. at 1268. See note 80 for a discussion of maintenance and cure benefits. The
claims that formed the object of the suit, however, were predicated on negligence.
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claim against the barge owner.' The employer brought an action in district court seeking contribution and indemnity from
the settling barge owner, but the claim was dismissed."'
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the order and held that a
nonsettling defendant was entitled to a proportionate share
reduction of the jury award and, thus, had no reason to seek
contribution from a settling defendant."' Although the court
identified all three possible alternatives pro tanto with contribution,"' pro tanto without contribution in conjunction with good
faith hearings,"' and proportionate share," 9 the court only
analyzed the latter two alternatives. 20 The court distinguished
the instant case from Edmonds on the ground that the barge
owner avoided trial by settling. 2' According to the court, the
instant case raised policy considerations involving encouraging
settlement and preventing collusion by settling parties.'2 2 Because the proportionate fault approach more effectively removed
the possibility of collusion in order to shift liability onto a
nonsettling party, the court found the proportionate share rule
superior to the pro tanto without contribution approach.'23
The Supreme Court considered McDermott against a context
of conflicting interpretations of Edmonds' effect on a nonsettling
defendant's liability. The Supreme Court's rejection of Edmonds
as applicable to settlement rested primarily on the fact that
Edmonds involved the statutory construction of the 1972 amend-

Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1267. The district court also lifted an injunction preventing Teasley
from suing in state court. Id.
116. Id. at 1271.
117. See note 22 for a description of the pro tanto with contribution approach.
118. See note 23 for a description of the pro tanto without contribution approach, and note 36 for the definition of a good faith hearing.
119. See note 24 for a description of the proportionate share approach.
120. Associated Electric, 931 F.2d at 1269-71. The court gave no reason for its
failure to consider the pro tanto with contribution approach.
121. Id. at 1270-71. The court distinguished the instant situation from
Edmonds, where the settling party avoided trial because the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act fixed its liability. Id.
122. Id. at 1271.
123. Id. The court also declined to characterize favorable settlements as double
recoveries, reasoning that because settlement dollars were often valued in ways that
judgement dollars were not, settlements reflected a conscious balancing of risks. Id.
at 1271 (citing Leger v. Drilling Well Control, 592 F.2d 1246, 1250 (l1th Cir. 1979)
(noting that settlement dollars may be worth more or less that judgment dollars,
depending on which party received the more favorable settlement)). Although the
court did not explain the distinction between the value of "settlement" dollars and
the value of "judgment" dollars, it can be assumed that the court recognized that
settlements were often the product of a host of factors, including a desire to avoid
litigation, which have value independent of the amount of money received.
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ment to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act while McDermott called for judicial fashioning of principles
governing settlement. 2' The Court's reading of Edmonds as
inapplicable to settlement is clearly less strained than the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Self."' This distinction draws additional force from the fact that Edmonds was a legislative response to the complexities that had evolved in determining a
ship's liability to an injured longshoreman."' It could be reasoned that both the defendants in Edmonds and McDermott
came to trial in similar positions because a joint tortfeasors'
liability had already been determined. Such an analogy, however, ignores the plaintiffs role in the legal relationship among the
parties. The Court adopted a more comprehensive analysis in
McDermott, distinguishing the situations on the grounds that in
McDermott, liability was affected by the plaintiffs choice to
settle, while in Edmonds, liability was affected by an act of
'
Congress. 27
The Court's decision was also guided by three principles consistency with Reliable Transfer, promotion of settlement and
judicial economy." 8 The Court's reasoning that Reliable Transfer compelled the adoption of the proportionate share approach,
however, rests on conscious abstraction of its facts.'29 Reliable
Transfer involved the allocation of liability among parties who
were both were present at trial."' McDermott, by definition,
involved an allocation of liability where one of the parties was
absent from trial. Therefore, in order to apply Reliable Transfer
to the facts of McDermott, the Court went through a two step
abstraction process. First, the Court treated a settling defendant
as the equivalent of a party whose liability had been fixed at a
trial. Second, the Court read Reliable Transfer broadly as holding that an at fault party should be responsible for only its equitable share of the damages. Ironically, if read this way, Reliable
Transfer seems to demand the adoption of the pro tanto with
contribution approach. This must be true because the pro tanto
124. McDermott, 114 S. Ct at 1471.
125. Id.
126. See note 92 for a discussion of the rules governing a ship's liability to an
injured longshoreman that existed prior to the amendment.
127. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1471.

128.

Id. at 1466-67.

129. The Court reasoned that neither rule was superior in its ability to serve
judicial economy or settlement. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1468-70. Therefore, the
Court elected to adopt the proportionate share approach on the basis that it better
served the policy underlying Reliable Transfer. Id. at 1470.
130. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 400. See notes 70-76 and the accompanying
text for a discussion of Reliable Transfer.
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with contribution approach is the only rule which ensures that a
defendant never pays more than its equitable share. 1 '
Because the Court avoided adopting the pro tanto with contribution approach by heavily favoring settlement and judicial
economy, the debate over consistency with Reliable Transfer was
limited to the choice between the proportionate share and pro
tanto without contribution approaches.'32 Nevertheless, it is
still not clear that the proportionate share approach is more
consistent with Reliable Transfer. The Court reasoned that the
proportionate share approach better served Reliable Transfer
because a litigating defendant would not be asked to pay more
than its equitable share. 3 ' The Court ignored the fact that the
situation involved two defendants.
While it is true that the proportionate share approach is more
consistent with Reliable Transfer as far as a litigating
defendant's liability is concerned, it is not consistent with Reliable Transfer as far as a settling defendant's liability is concerned. In fact, under the proportionate share approach, settling
parties take the result of their bargain no matter how inconsistent it may be with the eventual equitable apportionment of
liability.134 The pro tanto without contribution attempts to, at
least, mitigate the discrepancy by requiring a good faith hearing
to show that the settlement was a fair forecast of expected liability. Therefore, under the pro tanto without contribution approach, it is more likely that the amount paid by a settling defendant will accurately reflect a damage award.
The Court also reasoned that neither approach was superior
in its ability to further judicial economy.1 ' Although the

131. Because contribution actions are not allowed under either the proportionate
share or pro tanto without contribution approaches, it is likely that a settling
defendant's liability will not match its equitable share of the damages. The Court
recognized that settlements rarely accurately reflected the jury's allocation of damages. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1467.
132. The Court dismissed the pro tanto without contribution approach based on
that approach's failure to meet these considerations and did not discuss it in light of
Reliable Transfer. Id.
133. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1467.
134. In dismissing this objection, the Court relied on the argument that factors
unrelated to the determination of individual shares of liability often provided compelling reasons for deferring to the parties' determination of appropriate compensation rather than relying on a factfinder. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1468-69. These
factors include the cost of litigation and the desire for speedy and certain disposition. Id. By recognizing that 'these factors ought to be considered in determining a
nonsettling defendant's liability, the Court is effectively sanctioning extra-judicial
maneuvering in an attempt to increase costs and delay in hopes of obtaining a favorable settlement.
135. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1469.
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Court's analysis was not completely accurate, closer examination
reveals that the Court would not have reached a different conclusion because the proportionate share approach proves to better serve judicial economy. The Court reasoned that neither
approach was superior because both required a calculation of the
parties' relative degrees of liability and differed only in the
mechanisms used to calculate liability. 136 It is true that where
there are only two defendants, the liability of each is calculated
de facto under either rule. However, this does not hold true
where there are multiple defendants. For example, if three of
five defendants settle, under the proportionate share approach
all three settling defendants can be treated as one entity and
only the non-settling defendants' individual shares of fault need
to be determined. There is no need to calculate each settling
defendants' degree of fault because there is no right of contribution. The pro tanto without contribution approach, on the other
hand, always requires a calculation of each settling defendants'
liability, at least in a cursory fashion, at a good faith hearing.137 Thus, the rules are only comparable in their impact on
judicial economy where there are two defendants. Where there
are three or more, the proportionate share rule is clearly superior.
The Court further found that the effect of the two rules on
settlement was ambiguous and that any beneficial effect that
the pro tanto without contribution rule provided was the result
38
of threatening non-settling defendants with overpayment.
On this basis, the Court concluded that comparable settlement
rates could be achieved under either rule and thus neither rule
was preferable.139
This analysis oversimplifies the nature of the effect of the two
rules on settlement. Although it is true that the effect of the
rules on settlement is ambiguous, this phenomenon is a result of
the fact that each of the respective rules better encourages settlement under a different set of circumstances and not because
the rules necessarily yield comparable settlement rates. 140 Not

136. Id.
137. Id. The Court dismissed the possibility of adopting the pro tanto approach
without accompanying good faith hearings. Id. See notes 33 and 43 for a discussion
of why good faith hearings are a necessary component of the pro tanto approach.
138. Id. at 1468.
139. Id. at 1468-69. The Court reasoned that comparable settlement rates would
be achieved by the parties' desire to avoid litigation, uncertainty and interruption of
business relationships. Id.
140. See Kornhauser & Revesz, cited at note 40, at 447-63. Assuming perfect,
mathematically rational behavior, some of the more important factors in determining
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only does a complex host of factors affect which rule better encourages settlement, but each factor has the inherent possibility
of combining other factors to either mitigate or further enhance
the impact on settlement behavior."' Thus, the prevalence of
underlying circumstances determines which rule is more likely
to better encourage settlement.
The court reasoned that the pro tanto without contribution
rule encouraged settlement by threatening the non-settling defendant with overpayment and thus employed heavy handed
tactics to force settlement.'
Closer examination reveals that
the Court's analysis does not hold true under all circumstances.
For instance, when the cost of litigation is comparatively high,
and the plaintiffs probability of recovering against either defendant is independent, the proportionate share approach actually
has a coercive and unfair effect on settlement behavior."
When the cost of litigation is high, the plaintiff is more likely to
obtain a favorable initial settlement because the defendant will
want to avoid the high cost of litigation.'" Then, because the
plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defendant will not be
capped at -the balance of the damages, the plaintiff is likely to
pursue litigation against the nonsettling defendant in search of
a windfall.' The nonsettling defendant, in order to avoid the
high cost of litigation, also is likely to settle for an amount that
is greater than its proportionate share of the damages. "6 Under the proportionate share approach then, the plaintiff is likely

which rule will better encourage settlement are: litigation costs, perceptions of the
likelihood of success and independent versus correlative probability of success of the
claim. Id. If the likelihood of success against the defendants is perfectly correlative,
(assuming litigation) the plaintiff can not recover from one defendant without recovering from all defendants. Id. at 453. Thus, the plaintiffs probability of recovery is
always 50 %. Id. If the likelihood of success against the defendants is perfectly independent, (assuming litigation) the defendant can either recover in full from all defendants, not recover from any defendant, or recover from any one defendant individually. Id. at 449. Thus the plaintiffs probability of recovery is 75%. Id. Assuming a
perfectly rational model, this difference affects settlement behavior because a greater
likelihood of recovery will prompt a plaintiff to seek more in settlement. Id.
141. For example, assume that a defendant settles with one of two equally
responsible defendants for $75. Assume further that the cost of litigation against the
second defendant will be $30. Under the pro tanto rule, the maximum recovery
against the second defendant is $25, yielding a net loss of $5. However, under the
proportionate share rule, the recovery against the second defendant will be $50,
yielding a net gain of $20.
142. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1468. See notes 38-41 and the accompanying text
for a discussion of the Court's reasoning.
143. Kornhauser & Revesz, cited at note 40, at 469.
144. Id. at 467.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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to obtain a favorable disposition whether he settles or litigates
against the second defendant. Such a favorable situation arises
not because of a beneficial bargain, but rather because of coercive circumstances.
The Court was correct in identifying that neither rule was
systematically better at encouraging settlement. The Court,
however, failed to take the critical next step by not identifying
whether admiralty cases generally gave rise to the types of circumstances under which one rule is more likely to outperform
the other. As should be obvious, such an analysis would have
involved a painstaking survey of admiralty claims in search of
the prevalence of relevant factors.
On balance, neither rule is more consistent with Reliable
Transfer; the proportionate share rule is more judicially economical where there are three or more defendants; and neither rule
is systematically better at encouraging settlement. However,
each rule performs better under a given set of circumstances.
The Court listed the encouragement of settlement as one of only
three factors guiding its decision, but failed to adequately analyze whether the rule that it chose would actually serve that
end. Although the Court's decision may provide some relief to
overcrowded federal court dockets by promoting judicial economy, it also runs the risk of destroying any such advances by
encouraging litigation in some cases. Given the breadth and
complexity associated with determining which rule better serves
settlement, the choice of rules would have been better left to
Congress.
Joseph C. Safar

